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Legislative Amendment of Citizen 
Initiatives:
Where the “Will of the Voter” Meets the 
“Consent of the Elector”
by Derek P. Langhauser
INTRODUCTION
Maine continues to experience rela-tively frequent use of citizens’ 
initiatives.1 These initiatives have legis-
lated issues attracting broad attention 
such as school funding, recreational 
marijuana, minimum wage, transmis-
sion lines, ranked-choice voting, and 
Medicaid expansion, to name just a few. 
This frequent activity sparks several 
questions. Are such initiatives perceived 
necessary because elected representatives 
are not being responsive enough? Should 
the threshold for gathering signatures be 
raised to make the process more difficult 
to initiate? Should the people be able to 
initiate laws in areas that are both complex 
and implicate the legislature’s express core 
powers, such as taxation, spending, 
education, and general welfare? Should 
the legislature send out more competing 
measures?
Yet other questions recur when the 
legislature amends what the people have 
passed. Does the legislature’s amendment 
or repeal of such measures not long after 
the people approve them inappropriately 
trespass upon the will of the voters? How 
much deference, if any, has or should the 
legislature accord initiatives? In the 
future, if initiatives that propose substan-
tive movement on important or other-
wise populist issues succeed, the demand 
on the legislature to revisit those 
initiatives may increase, so, too, may 
these questions of whether the legislature 
can and should respond and, if yes, how 
far the responses should go. 
Recognition of possible legislative 
amendment or repeal may be disquieting 
to those who support initiatives, believe 
strongly in the merits of direct democ-
racy, and support passionately the care-
fully chosen text of their specific measure. 
All advocates in the political process work 
hard for their wins and none appreciates 
having their wins meaningfully altered, 
effectively diluted, or worse yet, outright 
repealed. But advocates and those citizens 
who are asked to sign a petition, give 
money, or vote at the polls should recall 
that, as a matter of fundamental Maine 
constitutional law, citizen-initiated and 
-approved legislation is like any other 
statute and is therefore subject to amend-
ment or repeal at any time. 
The purpose of this article is to 
discuss these issues by explaining the 
legislature’s authority to amend or repeal 
citizen initiatives, how and why the 
Maine Constitution specifically provides 
for that authority, and how and why that 
approach is conceptually consistent with 
numerous other provisions and principles 
of our Constitution. This article further 
suggests the types of issues that, regardless 
of the subject matter in question, the 
legislature should consider in deter-
mining whether, and if so how and when, 
to change a directly democratic act of the 
people. Such considerations when 
earnestly applied can serve to balance the 
legislature’s representational duty to mind 
the popular will as well as its leadership 
responsibility to steward the state with 




Maine is one of 23 states that authorize the people to initiate 
new, amended, or repealed statutes. By 
comparison, 12 of those states provide for 
direct initiatives (proposals that qualify 
go directly on the ballot); nine, like 
Maine, provide for indirect initiatives 
(proposals are submitted to the legisla-
ture, which has an opportunity to act 
on the proposed legislation, and the 
initiative question goes on the ballot 
if the legislature rejects it, submits a 
different proposal, or takes no action); 
and two provide for both direct and indi-
rect initiatives.2
Maine’s history of permitting initia-
tives is more than 100 years old. The 
initiative provision of the Maine 
Constitution was enacted in 1909 and 
first used in 1911.3 Thereafter, and for the 
first six decades, only seven initiatives 
received a popular vote. It was not until 
1970 that initiatives began to appear on 
ballots more frequently.4 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
and the Maine attorney general5 have 
both recognized that the legislature has 
the power to repeal or amend an initiated 
or referred law and that the legislature 
may do so either expressly or by implica-
tion. All told, from 1909 to the date of 
this publication, there have been 78 initia-
tives.6 Seven were approved by the legisla-
ture and consequently never went to 
referenda. That is the rare path. Although 
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legislative review and disapproval of 
initiatives is a constitutional prerequisite 
to a popular vote, such disapproval is not 
a reflection of the chambers’ views on the 
merits. The legislature typically votes to 
send initiatives to the people not as any 
statement on the merits but simply so 
that citizens may have their say. 
That leaves 71 that went to referenda 
(nine of those with competing measures), 
and 36 failed and 35 were approved. Of 
the 35 that were approved, 29 were 
amended at least once by the legislature. 
Of those 29, 21 were amended either at 
the next session of the same term or the 
next legislative term, and eight were 
amended or repealed years later. So, over 
the full history of the provision, the 
Maine Legislature has amended or 
repealed popularly approved initiatives 
about 83 percent of the time. 
Depending on one’s perspective, 
many of these changes may be regarded as 
technical in nature. As such, they did not 
attract attention or debate. Others though 
have been more substantive, such as the 
amendment in 2005 immediately after 
voters approved an initiated change to the 
state’s funding formula for general 
purpose aid to K–12 education.7 This was 
done expressly to temper the popular will 
with an acknowledgment of fiscal reality. 
THE SHARED POWER OF 
LAWMAKING: THE PEOPLE 
AND LEGISLATURE
The Maine Constitution delegates lawmaking powers to the people 
and the legislature alike. Under the 
Constitution, the people are the sover-
eign source of the state. They have the 
express rights to “give instructions to 
their representatives,” and to request by 
“petition or remonstrance redress of their 
wrongs and grievances.” They also have 
an “unalienable and indefeasible right 
to institute government, and to alter, 
reform, or totally change the [govern-
ment] when their safety and happiness 
require it.” They “reserve to themselves 
power to propose laws and to enact or 
reject the same at the polls independent 
of the Legislature” (i.e., initiative), and 
also “reserve power at their own option 
to approve or reject at the polls any 
Act, bill, resolve or resolution passed by 
the joint action of both branches of the 
Legislature” (i.e., referendum).8 
The people’s lawmaking powers are 
in addition to, and not in replacement of, 
the lawmaking powers of the legislature. 
The legislature may use its own powers to 
propose, enact, and override vetoes of 
legislation at their own will, even if it is 
on the same subject as that addressed by 
the people.9 For its part, the legislature is 
not bound by a previous legislature’s 
determinations and cannot bind a 
successor legislature10 because each legis-
lature retains plenary lawmaking 
authority during its biennial term.
THE LEGISLATURE’S CORE 
LAWMAKING POWERS
In addition to these core legislative operating principles, the Maine 
Constitution speaks expressly to four core 
powers of the legislature. Increasingly, 
citizen initiatives address subjects within 
the scope of these powers. 
The first category is the police 
power. Under the broad police power, 
the governor may propose and pass any 
law that the governor “may deem expe-
dient,” and the legislature may propose 
any law deemed “reasonable…for the 
defense and benefit of People…[and] not 
repugnant to the Constitution(s).” This 
broad police power is the legislature’s 
core duty and responsibility and there-
fore cannot be bargained or granted 
away.11
Next are the taxation powers. 
Because taxation fundamentally burdens 
the citizens, the Constitution provides 
that no tax may “be imposed without the 
consent of the people or of their represen-
tatives in the Legislature.” Because taxes 
are also the essential source of govern-
ment revenues, the Constitution also 
expressly states that the legislature “shall 
never, in any manner, suspend or 
surrender the power of taxation.”12 This 
means that the legislature is not, and 
cannot be, required to defer to a citizens’ 
initiative involving taxes because such 
requirement would constitute a suspen-
sion or surrender of that power. 
Third is the education power. The 
Constitution expressly provides that the 
legislature is “authorized, and it shall be 
their duty to require, the several towns to 
make suitable provision, at their own 
expense, for the support and mainte-
nance of public schools.” The legislature 
also has the power to “provide that taxes, 
which it may authorize a School 
Administrative District or a community 
school district to levy, may be assessed on 
real, personal and intangible property in 
accordance with any cost-sharing formula 
which it may authorize.”  The Constitution 
expressly provides these powers to the 
legislature because it recognizes that a 
“general diffusion of the advantages of 
education…[is] essential to the preserva-
tion of the rights and liberties of the 
people.” The Constitution entrusts these 
powers to the Legislature in order to 
“promote this important object.”13
Finally, there is the spending power. 
The Constitution expressly provides that 
“no money shall be drawn without an 
appropriation or allocation authorized by 
law.” Although the people may use an 
initiative for revenue legislation, when an 
initiative proposes to raise or spend 
significant amounts of money, such 
initiative implicates more substantially 
 MAINE POLICY REVIEW  •  Vol. 30, No. 1  •  2021 60
COMMENTARY
the Legislature’s responsibilities to enact a 
balanced biennial budget. The biennial 
budget is at the core of a legislature’s 
work; it is the measure that most compre-
hensively provides for the “defense and 
benefit of the People” under the police 
power clause and directly advances the 
“public peace, health and safety” under 
the emergency enactment clause.14
PARALLEL, RECIPROCAL, AND 
DYNAMIC LAWMAKING POWERS
The legislature and people share the same power: the power to enact. 
And what they each have the power 
to enact is also the same: a statute, 
a form of law that is always capable 
of amendment by subsequent action of 
the people, the legislature, or both. The 
powers of the legislature and people to 
enact are parallel; neither is superior to 
the other or absolute. Consistent with the 
Constitution’s broader scheme of sepa-
ration of powers and its core mediating 
tension of checks and balances, the legis-
lature and people each have the power to 
change the acts of the other.
The relationship between these 
parallel powers is, by design of the 
Constitution, reciprocal and dynamic: 
reciprocal because voters can change a 
law enacted by the legislature, and the 
legislature can change a law approved by 
the voters; and dynamic because such 
changes can occur whenever, and however 
often, either the people or the legislature 
has the will and the votes to do so. 
The Constitution intentionally does 
not confer greater legal status to an initi-
ated enactor over a legislated enactor. To 
do so would grant supremacy to direct 
democracy over the principles of repre-
sentative democracy that define the 
Maine Constitution. Such supremacy 
could ultimately hold the state captive to 
the initiative process, and the text and 
design of our Constitution make clear 
that the Framers understood and rejected 
that approach. Instead, the Constitution 
gives voters the right to govern directly 
but only as checked by possible subse-
quent legislative action. If citizens object 
to that change, they can elect other repre-
sentatives or initiate other legislation. 
That dynamic will inevitably cause 
tension between the people and their 
representatives, but that is exactly how 
checks and balances work within the 
shared lawmaking powers of an engaged 
citizenry and a conscientious legislature.
In short, an initiative is but one step 
in the dynamic process of lawmaking: a 
process that never ends, that moves from 
session to session in a continuous govern-
ment elected to act in biennial periods of 
time,15 that encourages and tolerates 
ongoing debates, and accepts disparate 
and even conflicting outcomes at 
different times along the way.
QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN INITIATIVE AND 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES
The Constitution sets forth only broad procedures by which an initiative 
and legislation are enacted. The initia-
tive process is defined by articulating 
a succinct question, getting a certain 
number of supportive signatures, giving 
the legislature the opportunity to accept 
or reject the measure either outright or 
by a competing measure),16 and then 
holding statewide election. As a practical 
matter, the legislature has rarely enacted 
the initiative as is (only 7 times in 78 
opportunities), rarely proposed its own 
competing measures (only 9 times in 
78 opportunities), and instead, typically 
votes against the measure as is. Citizens 
are principally advised of the measure 
through the advocacy of proponents and 
opponents. 
By contrast, the legislative process of 
policy formulation occurs within a much 
more structured framework. This process 
begins with drafting assisted by expert 
staff. It then requires an initial review by 
a subject-focused committee. After 
committee hearings, work sessions, and 
debate, amendments are typically devised. 
Unanimous or divided reports then go to 
the floors of both Houses where further 
debate, floor amendments, and confer-
ence committees work to achieve the 
bicameral concurrence required by the 
Constitution. The measure then goes to 
the governor who may, among other 
choices, line-item veto the measure or 
permit the legislature to recall it before-
hand;17 either way, giving the measure 
even more opportunity for refinement.
This process of legislative enact-
ment—whatever else its flaws—generates 
more objective fact finding, clearer issue 
identification, and broader attention to 
unintended consequences than populist 
advocacy. As a result, this process, again 
whatever its own shortcomings, typically 
admits fewer threats of issue isolation and 
issue distortion by special interests.
RECOGNITION OF—AND 
CONSTRAINTS TO—THE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE
As noted in the introduction, one important question is whether 
the legislature’s amendment or repeal 
of such measures not long after the 
people approve them inappropriately 
trespasses upon the will of the voters. 
Under the Maine Constitution, the will 
of the people is recognized in six primary 
ways: granting consent to first estab-
lish the Maine Constitution; approving 
subsequent amendments to the Maine 
Constitution; voting for the governor, 
senators, and representatives; proposing 
and voting on citizens’ initiatives; voting 
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on policy referenda; and voting on bond 
referenda.18
By forming and maintaining the 
Constitution, the people consented to its 
limitations on their own acts of direct 
democracy. By voting on referenda, citi-
zens get their say on legislation but only 
within the broader context of the 
Constitution, which grants the legislature 
a plenary police power to enact laws, a 
power that includes the authority to 
amend or repeal an initiated law. And by 
electing representatives, citizens delegate 
broad authority to their representatives to 
think for themselves and act on the 
people’s behalf. Indeed, a vote for office 
authorizes the representative to vote for 
or against a myriad of bills, nominees, 
resolutions, orders, or sentiments during 
their elected term. The only stated limit on 
the representatives’ judgment is their 
commitment to their oaths of office to 
faithfully discharge their duties and 
support the state and federal 
constitutions.19   
The people’s consent to a constitu-
tional scheme of government also means 
that their acts of direct democracy are 
subject to the doctrine of checks and 
balances. This doctrine distributes power 
among the three branches of govern-
ment20 and the people’s interaction with 
those branches. This distribution includes 
a significant number of limitations on the 
people. As already discussed, the legisla-
ture retains plenary power to change an 
initiated law, and the governor can join 
the effort by recommending measures the 
governor deems expedient.21 But there are 
many more ways—indeed, at least 20—
in which our Constitution, with the 
people’s consent, restrains the people. 
For example, the people cannot 
initiate a constitutional amendment, 
bond issue, a measure that is not legisla-
tive in character, a measure that de facto 
amends the United States Constitution or 
a measure that suspends rather than 
repeals a law, and cannot enforce an 
approved measure found to violate the 
Constitution. The people cannot recall a 
governor, senator, or representative, and 
cannot convene the legislature into 
session. The Constitution does not permit 
the legislature to surrender to the people 
its police or taxation powers. 
Supermajority two-thirds votes are 
required for a variety of actions, even 
when a simple majority can be argued to 
be more reflective of the people’s will. 
These votes include, for example, actions 
related to emergency measures, impeach-
ment, veto overrides, confirmation proce-
dures, and removing a disabled governor. 
They also include certain matters 
regarding bond issues, mining, state 
mandates, and state parks.22  
Similarly, the House and Senate are 
authorized to disqualify, punish, and 
expel a member elected by the people. 
The legislature controls the power of 
impeachment, and the legislature and 
Maine Supreme Court chief justice 
decide gubernatorial disability. And, of 
course, the courts can render and enforce 
decisions even if they are politically 
unpopular. Finally, and perhaps most 
dramatically, the people have even 
consented to the legislature acting outside 
the Constitution’s rights and limitations 
when the severe needs for “continuity of 
government” so require.23 
LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
ON CHANGING AN 
INITIATED LAW
If initiatives proliferate in Maine, partic-ularly on issues viewed as divisive, 
legislators will increasingly be invited to 
consider subsequent changes. Legislators 
may be more or less inclined to do so 
depending upon the subject matter or 
issues of principle, policy, passion, or 
politics. Some legislators may believe 
that initiatives as express acts of direct 
democracy are entitled to strict deference 
ab initio. Others may so passionately 
object to the policy that they eschew any 
such notion of deference. Yet others will 
occupy positions in between. 
So, a two-part threshold question is 
what, if any, higher scrutiny or deference 
should be applied to an approved initia-
tive, and how is that standard defined and 
determined to be met? Again, as the 
Constitution does not require a superma-
jority, such as two-thirds, vote to change 
an approved initiative, that is not the 
standard. 
A practical approach to addressing 
this question would be to identify the 
types of issues, regardless of the subject 
matter, that should be considered in 
determining whether straight deference is 
outweighed in any instance. Such consid-
erations might include, for example, the 
following:
•  Circumstances—How long ago 
was the measure approved? To 
what degree have the circum-
stances foreseen for regulation 
changed?
• Role—To what degree does the 
measure interfere with a core 
responsibility typically reposed 
to the legislature, such as public 
safety, spending, taxation, or 
education? Does the measure 
involve a subject matter with the 
type of reaching and complex 
consequences that benefit from 
the legislature’s deliberative 
process? 
• Compliance—To what degree 
does the measure present on its 
face or as applied material legal 
questions? Does the measure lack 
clarity? Is it under- or over-inclu-
sive? Does it otherwise present 
compliance confusion?
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• Conflicts—To what degree does 
the measure materially conflict 
with other Maine laws? Was the 
measure crafted from existing 
Maine law? Or is it a template 
imported from other state(s) 
with different demographics 
and regulatory schemes?
• Scope—To what degree is the 
measure one of broad vs limited 
application or scope? To what 
degree would a change be as 
broad or as narrow? 
• Passage—What percentage of 
electors voted on the measure? 
By what percentage did it 
pass? To what degree does 
the measure reflect the will of 
certain parts of the state more 
so than other parts? To what 
degree are there legitimate 
concerns with the accuracy or 
completeness of the informa-
tion presented to the people? 
Thoughtful persons can identify 
additional or alternative considerations. 
The point here is that when the legisla-
ture considers addressing the merits of an 
approved initiative, conscientious 
lawmaking should be applied regardless 
of whether the legislature ends up 
standing upon deference or crafting a 
response deemed better suited to the 
perceived needs of the day. Either way, as 
noted in the introduction, legislators will 
have tended to both their representa-
tional duty to show respect for the 
popular will and their leadership respon-
sibility to possibly better steward the 
interests of the state.
CONCLUSION
The right of the people to initiate and enact legislation is an important 
component of their sovereignty. While 
that right is express, it is exercised within 
the Constitution’s distribution of express 
and implied delegated powers between 
the people and the three branches of 
government. It is the doctrine of checks 
and balances that distributes power 
between those four sovereign actors and 
both authorizes and obligates the legis-
lature to judge and moderate the direct 
democratic acts of the people. This is 
the way that our Constitution, which 
decidedly created a representative democ-
racy, checks, balances, and integrates 
the people’s important acts of direct 
democracy.
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NOTES
1 “The initiative has become an increas-
ingly widespread device for addressing a 
variety of societal concerns, such as land 
use regulations, environmental policy, and 
public health issues.” Marshall Tinkle, The 
Maine State Constitution, A Reference 
Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1992), 91. This article addresses only 
initiatives pursuant to Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 
3, § 18; it does not analyze referenda (laws 
initiated and passed by the legislature and 
then subject to people’s approval or veto) 
pursuant to Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17. 
2 National Council of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) at https://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-
initiative-states.aspx. For more detailed 
information on the various states’ different 




3 Interestingly enough, the legislature 
promptly amended the first popularly 
approved measure. P.L. 1913, ch. 221 
amended by P.L. 1915, ch. 47, § 2. 
4 Tinkle, 1992.
5 Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693, 
695 (Me. 1996) citing, among others 
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 
(1905). Op. Me. Att’y Gen. No. 05-4 at 2005 
WL 4542877 (Me. A.G.); Op. Me. Att’y Gen. 
(April 26, 1976) at 1976 Me. AG. Lexis 126.
6 The figures in this section are based 
upon research conducted with Cleaves 
Law Library and the Law and Legislative 
Reference Library. The exact tabulation of 
“subsequent amendments” is challenging 
because a law can be amended directly 
by express act and indirectly by changes 
to related laws. This article counted only 
the direct amendments that the libraries 
identified.  
7 I.B. 2003, ch. 2 amended by P.L. 2005, 
ch. 2. Changes to that formula are both 
complicated and consequential as GPA 
accounts for about two-thirds of all state 
spending in a fiscal year.  
8 The rights discussed in this paragraph are 
(in order discussed) set forth in Me. Const. 
art. I, § 15; art. I, § 2; art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, and 
pt. 3, § 18; and art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, and pt. 3, 
§ 17. Furthermore, the legislature cannot 
interfere with the submission of initiated 
measures to the people either by action 
or by inaction and cannot enact amend-
ments to a law during the period in which 
a competing measure is pending before 
the voters (Ferris ex rel. Dorsky v. Gross, 
143 Me. 227, 232 [1948]; Op. Me. Att’y 
Gen. No. 97-1 at 1997 WL 664660 [1997]; 
Tinker [1992]). 
9 Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1, and §§ 2 and 
2-A. The governor also has the related 
powers to introduce and veto legislation, 
but the governor does not have the power 
to enact (Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 9 and 
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, §§ 2 and 2-A).
10 See, for example, Jones v. Maine State 
Highway Commission, 238 A.2d 226, 230 
(1968), citing Baxter et al. v. Waterville 
Sewerage District et al., 79 A.2d 585, 588 
(1951).
11 Broad police power is described in Me. 
Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 9, and art. IV, pt. 3, § 
1. See also, for example, First Nat. Bank of 
Boston v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 136 
A.2d 699, 708 (1957).
12 Imposing taxes is set forth in Me. Const. 
art. I, § 22 and art. IX, § 8, and suspending 
taxes in Me. Const. art. IX, § 9. The Maine 
Supreme Court has recognized that the 
power of taxation is an essential attribute 
of sovereignty. See, for example, Town 
of Milo v. Milo Water Co., 131 Me. 372, 
378-89 (1932).  
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13 Support for education is set forth in Me. 
Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; taxes for schools 
in art. IX, § 8(3); and importance of public 
education in art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1. 
14 Sources for this paragraph are (in order of 
appearance) found in Me. Const. art. V, pt. 
3, § 4; Opinion of Justices, 370 A.2d 654, 
667-68 (Me. 1977) (revenue legislation); 
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1 (broad power 
to enact includes budget bills) and Me. 
Const. art. IX, § 14 (implying requirement 
that budget be balanced in order to avoid 
unauthorized debt); Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 
3, § 1 (police power clause); and emer-
gency measures are enacted pursuant to 
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16.
15 See Me. Const. art. IX, § 17 and art. II, § 4.
16 Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18.  As an inter-
esting aside, the Law Court has held that 
emergency legislation amending a statute 
that an initiated measure seeks to repeal 
does not constitute a competing measure 
(McCaffrey v. Gartley, 377 A.2d 1367 [Me. 
1977]). Likewise, the legislature may not 
enact amendments to a law during the 
period in which a competing measure is 
pending before the voters (Op. Me. Att’y 
Gen. No. 97-1).
17 Provision for this legislative process is set 
forth in Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2 and 
2A. Permitting the legislature to recall it 
beforehand is an implied power under 
the presentment clause in Me. Const. art. 
IV, pt. 3, § 2 and recognized expressly in 
Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure, 
§753 (3).
18 The six primary ways in which the will 
of the people is recognized are (in order 
listed in paragraph) found in Me. Const. 
preamble; art. X, § 4; art. II, § 1; art. IV, pt. 
3, §§  18 and 17; and art. IX, §14.
19 Me. Const. art, IX, § 1. 
20 Me. Const. art. III, §§1 and 2.
21 Note also that the legislature may also use 
its lawmaking powers to not fully fund a 
measure approved by voters.
22 These constraints are recognized in Me. 
Const. art. X, § 4 (constitutional amend-
ment); art. IX, § 14; Opinion of Justices, 
191 A.2d 357, 360 (1963) (bond issues); 
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of 
State, 2020 ME 109 (legislative char-
acter); Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d 
693, 697 (Me. 1996) (citing U.S. Const. 
art. V); and Opinion of Justices, 370 A.2d 
654, 669 (Me. 1977) (suspending laws). 
Inability to recall a governor is implied by 
exclusion from Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 
7, art. IV, pt. 1, § 8, and art. IX, § 5. Inability 
to recall a senator or representative is 
implied by exclusion from Me. Const. art. 
IV, pt. 3, § 4; and inability to convene a 
legislative session from Me. Const. art. 
IV, pt. 3, § 1. See First Nat. Bank of Boston 
v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 136 A.2d 
at 708 for discussion of police powers, 
and Me. Const. art. IX, § 9 for taxation 
powers. Other sources from the Maine 
Constitution include art. IV, pt. 3, § 16 
(emergency measures); art. IV, pt. 2, § 
7 (impeachment); art. IV, pt. 3, § 2 (veto 
overrides); art. V, pt. 1, § 8, ¶ 3, and § 14 
(confirmation procedures and removing 
a disabled governor); and art. IX, § 14 
(bonds), §20 (mining), § 21 (mandates), § 
23 (state parks).
23 Sources for this paragraph include (in 
order discussed) Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, 
§§ 3 and 4; art. IV, pt. 2, § 7; art. IV, pt. 1, 
§ 8; and art. IX, § 5; art. V, pt. 1, §§ 14 and 
15; art. VI, § 1; and art. IX, § 17.
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